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Abstract
This paper studies the eect of India's rural public works program on rural-to-
urban migration and urban labor markets. We nd that seasonal migration from
rural districts that implemented the program decreased relative to those that were
selected to, but did not implement it. We next use a gravity model and nd that real
wages rose faster in cities with higher predicted migration from program districts.
Since most seasonal migrants work outside of their district, urban spillovers were not
limited to program districts, and may have attracted migrants from non-program
districts. Dierence-in-dierences may hence be biased. Structural estimates indeed
suggest that migration decreased by 22% in program districts, but also increased
by 5% in non-program districts. As a result, urban wages increased by only 0.5%,
against 4.1% if the program had been implemented in all selected districts.
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Since rural and urban areas of developing countries are integrated via migration ows,
rural development programs may have signicant eects on urban labor markets (Harris
and Todaro, 1970). Specically, a policy that improves employment opportunities in rural
areas may reduce migration from rural to urban areas, and push up urban wages (Fields,
2005). Providing empirical evidence on these spillovers is challenging, for at least three
reasons. First, the rural development policy needs to be large enough to aect urban
areas, and to be placed somewhat exogenously to allow for causal identication of its
eects. Second, comprehensive data on labor reallocation between rural and urban areas
is required. Migration ows may include long-term migration, which is usually available
from population censuses, but also short-term (or seasonal) migration, which can only
be measured with dedicated survey data. Third, standard empirical frameworks - such
as a dierence-in-dierences approach which would compare towns located in rural areas
with and without the policy - may not be able to capture spatial spillovers if they are
not strictly local.
In this paper, we estimate the spatial spillover eects of India's National Rural Em-
ployment Guarantee Act (NREGA). The NREGA is a workfare program, which hires
rural adults on local public works during the agricultural o-season.1 It is a very large
program, with close to 50 million household participants in 2013.2 In previous work, we
showed that it had signicant impacts on rural labor markets (Imbert and Papp, 2015).
Here, we use variation in NREGA implementation across rural districts selected to receive
the program to estimate its eect on rural to urban migration and urban labor markets.
Our measure of migration comes from the National Sample Survey (NSS). It reveals
that seasonal ows play a major role in labor reallocation between rural and urban areas
of India: 8.1 million adults left their village to work one to six months in urban areas in
2007. These ows are large when compared to the net ow of long term migrants, who
come to work and settle in urban areas (0.4 million). They are also large when compared
to the number of urban residents engaged in unskilled wage work (14 million). Hence,
small changes in seasonal migration may have large eects on urban labor markets.3
Our empirical strategy proceeds in three steps. First, among rural districts selected to
receive the program by 2007 (early districts"), we compare those located in states that
actively implemented the NREGA (star states") with the others, which received little
public employment.4 Dierence-in-dierences estimates show that public employment
1Workfare programs are common anti-poverty policies. A report by The World Bank (2015) found
them active in 94 countries in 2014.
2Ocial reports available at http://nrega.nic.in.
3Authors' calculations based on the NSS Employment-Unemployment Survey (July 2007-June 2008).
4Our strategy diers from (Imbert and Papp, 2015), in which we compared early and late districts.
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increased by 7.4 days per rural adult, wages increased by 5.7% and the prevalence of
seasonal migration decreased by 50% in early districts of star states as compared to other
early districts. One would expect such a large decrease in migration to aect urban labor
markets. However, since 87% of seasonal migrants leave their district, the migration
spillovers of the NREGA will not be felt in local towns, but in cities further away.
In the second step, we use a gravity model to predict seasonal migration ows into each
urban center. We then compare wage trends in cities with high predicted migration rates
from program districts to wage trends in other cities to identify urban spillovers. The
results suggest that real wages rose faster in cities most exposed to the drop in seasonal
migration due to the program (+2.4% on average). Reassuringly, these dierential urban
wage trends were not present before the program was implemented or after it was rolled
out in all rural districts. They are also not concentrated in early districts or in star states,
alleviating concerns that the states' decision to implement the NREGA was endogenous
to urban outcomes. Overall, these results conrm that the program reduced migration
from rural to urban areas and increased urban wages.
However, we also nd evidence of lower wage growth in urban centers with higher
predicted migration from non-program districts (-1.1% on average), which suggests that
migration from non-program districts responded to the program. This casts doubt on
the validity of our rst dierence-in-dierences approach, which compares migration from
rural districts with and without the program. To tackle this issue, we develop a spatial
equilibrium model and show that in presence of spatial spillovers, dierence-in-dierences
are indicative of the sign, but not the magnitude of the eect. The model also suggests
how to adjust dierence-in-dierences by taking into account explicitly the structure of
migration ows and the equilibrium eects. We derive from it two estimating equations
which link rural wages, migration and urban wages via three elasticities: the migration
elasticity with respect to wages at home, the migration elasticity with respect to wages
at destination and the urban labor demand elasticity.
In the third step of our empirical analysis, we stucturally estimate these elasticities.
The migration elasticity with respect to wages at destination is positive, large and signi-
cant (2.4). The migration elasticity with respect to wages at home is negative, signicant
and even larger in absolute terms (-5.6), which suggests a home bias among seasonal
migrants. The estimated labor demand elasticity is −0.22, but imprecisely estimated.
We use these estimates to compute the eect of the program on migration and urban
wages. Our calibration implies that migration from program districts decreased by 22%,
and migration from non-program districts increased by more than 5%, so that dierence-
This is due to the fact that prevalence of short-term migration to urban areas is low in late districts
(0.8%).
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in-dierences overestimate the eect of the program by 20%. The implied increase in
urban wages is small, 0.5%, but may have been as large as 4.1% if the NREGA had been
implemented by all districts which were initially selected (early districts).
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we present evidence that
local development policies can have substantial spatial equilibrium eects. The spatial
equilibrium literature has provided abundant evidence that workers move in response to
changes in employment opportunities (Glaeser, 2008; Kennan and Walker, 2011). How-
ever, most empirical studies that evaluate the eect of local development policies (Green-
stone et al., 2010; Busso et al., 2013) or local labor demand shocks (Hornbeck, 2012;
Autor et al., 2013) compare changes in employment and wages between places that are
aected by the policy or the shock to those that are not, and rule out the possibility
of spatial spillovers. When spillovers are considered, they are assumed to be local, e.g.
Neumark and Kolko (2010) estimate spillover eects by comparing control units that are
just next to treatment units with other control units that are further away. The same ap-
plies to the literature on rural development policies (Duo and Pande, 2007; Dinkelman,
2011) and rural-urban linkages (Bustos et al., 2016; Santangelo, 2016). Three papers
closely related to ours are Monras (2015) and Monras (2018) who studies the spillover
eects of Mexican migration and economic shocks across US labor markets, and Manning
and Petrongolo (2011) who show evidence of job search across local labor markets in the
UK. Our contribution is to show empirically that a place-based development policy that
increases labor demand locally can have large far-reaching spatial spillover eects.
Second, we present evidence that a commonly used anti-poverty policy signicantly
aects the extent of labor reallocation towards the urban non-agricultural sector. The
development economics literature has been concerned with this issue since at least Harris
and Todaro (1970), who considered the joint determination of the rural and urban labor
markets equilibrium and the urban impact of rural development policies (Fields, 2005).
The recent literature on structural transformation identies the lack of labor mobility as
an important obstacle to development (Gollin and Rogerson, 2014; Kraay and McKenzie,
2014; Bryan and Morten, 2015). Most empirical studies provide evidence on policies that
help rural workers to leave their village: transport subsidies for seasonal migrants in
Bangladesh (Bryan et al., 2014), cash-transfer programs for international migrants from
Mexico (Angelucci, 2015) or rural roads for commuters to local towns in India (Asher
and Novosad, 2015). We show that by improving alternative employment opportunities
in the village, rural public works programs such as the NREGA reduce rural to urban
migration.5 We also estimate the eect of the induced change in migration on the urban
5In a companion paper (Imbert and Papp, 2018), we conrm the migration impacts of the NREGA
using original survey data from a high-migration area and argue that migrants' decision to stay back for
much lower NREGA wages is indicative of large migration costs.
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sector. Recent papers have shown that rural development policies aect the non-farm
sector through capital, trade or labor ows, but these dierent channels are typically
dicult to identify (Bustos et al., 2016; Marden, 2015; Santangelo, 2016).
Third, we estimate the labor market eects of changes in seasonal migration ows
within a developing economy. The migration literature focuses heavily on the impact of
international immigration on earnings and employment of natives in developed economies
(Card, 1990, 2001; Friedberg, 2001; Borjas, 2003). Some recent papers have estimated the
eect of changes in within-country migration, driven by a productivity shock (Kleemans
and Magruder, 2014; Badaoui et al., 2014), an inow of international migrants (Monras,
2015), or the generosity of social programs (Boustan et al., 2010). This second set of
studies typically nds larger negative eects on wages, which may be due to the fact
that internal migrants are a better substitute to "natives" than international migrants.
Most studies consider long-term movements of workers, except Dustmann et al. (2017),
who estimate the eect of Czech commuters on German labor markets. We study the
movement of workers who are neither commuters nor long-term migrants, but leave their
village to spend the agricultural o-season working in urban areas. This type of migration
is common in developing countries (Banerjee and Duo, 2007; Bryan et al., 2014; Morten,
2016). Our contribution is to show that seasonal ows are highly reactive to changes in
employment opportunities and can have large eects on labor markets at destination.
The following section describes the workfare program and presents the data set used
throughout the paper. Section 3 provides a simple conceptual framework to guide the
empirical analysis. Section 4 uses a reduced form approach to estimate the impact of
the NREGA on migration from rural areas and on urban labor markets across India.
Section 5 adopts a more structural approach to quantify direct and spillover eects of the
program. Section 6 concludes.
2 Context and data
In this section we describe employment provision under the National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act. We next present the data we use in the empirical analysis.
2.1 The NREGA
India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), passed in September 2005,
entitles every household in rural India to 100 days of work per year at a state-specic
minimum wage. The act was gradually introduced throughout India starting with 200
of the poorest districts in February 2006, extending to 130 additional districts in April
5
2007, and to the rest of rural India in April 2008. The assignment of districts to phases
was partly based on a backwardness index computed by the Planning Commission, using
poverty rate, agricultural productivity, agricultural wages and the share of tribal popula-
tion as poverty criteria (Planning Commission, 2003). In the analysis we will call "early
districts" the districts in which the scheme was implemented by April 2007 and late
districts the rest of rural India.
The available evidence suggests substantial variation in the implementation of the
program across states and even districts (Dreze and Khera, 2009; Dreze and Oldiges,
2009). Figure 1 shows the extent of cross-state variation in public works employment in
1999-00 (before the NREGA) and 2007-08 (when the NREGA was implemented in early
districts). The graph suggests that the NREGA increased massively public employment
in rural areas. It also make clear that this increase was very uneven across states. As
in Imbert and Papp (2015) we use the term star states to describe seven states that
provided more than 3 days of employment per rural adult in 2007-08, and were thus
responsible for most NREGA employment provision. These states are Andhra Pradesh,
Chhattisgarh, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttarkhand and Tamil
Nadu (see map in Figure 3). Dutta et al. (2012) argue that cross-states dierences in
NREGA implementation did not reect underlying demand for NREGA work. States
such as Bihar or Uttar Pradesh, which have a large population of rural poor, provided
little NREGA employment.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 1 present means of socio-economic indicators in early
districts of star and non-star states.6 Early districts of star states do not seem to be
systematically richer nor poorer than early districts of other states. Poverty rates are
lower in star states and literacy rates are higher, but population shares of scheduled caste
are the same, and shares of scheduled tribes are higher. Early districts in star states have a
larger fraction of the labor force in agriculture, and a higher agricultural productivity per
worker, but the employment shares of manufacturing and services and wages for salaried
labor are the same. Finally, they have similar access to paved roads and to banks, but
better access to electricity, education, health and telecommunication facilities (according
to 2001 census data). They also spend more per capita under the national rural road
program (PMGSY) and under national watershed programs in 2007-08, which suggests
that they may be more eective in implementing public infrastructure programs.
An important question is whether dierences in economic conditions or public service
delivery can explain dierences in public employment provision under the NREGA be-
tween star and non-star states. Figure 2 plots for each state the average residual from
a regression of the fraction of time spent on public works by prime age adults on the
6Appendix B details how we construct these indicators.
6
whole list of district characteristics presented in Table 1 as well as worker controls.7 The
ranking of states in terms of public employment provision remains strikingly similar to
Figure 1.8 This provides support to the idea that dierences in NREGA implementation
are not mainly driven by dierences in economic conditions or public service delivery,
which could have independent eects on rural labor market outcomes and migration to
urban areas.
Public employment provision is also highly seasonal. Local governments start and stop
works throughout the year, with most works concentrated during the rst two quarters of
the year prior to the monsoon. The monsoon rains make construction projects dicult to
undertake. Field reports further document government attempts to keep work-sites closed
throughout the fall so they do not compete with the labor needs of farmers (Association
for Indian Development, 2009). According to the National Sample Survey 2007-08, the
average number of days spent on public works per rural adult was above one day during
the rst and second quarter of the year (January to June), and about a quarter of a
day during the third and fourth quarter (July to December). This implies that public
employment provision under the NREGA is highest during the agricultural lean season,
when short-term migration is most prevalent (Coey et al., 2015; Imbert and Papp, 2018).
Work under the act is short-term, often on the order of a few weeks per adult. Ac-
cording to the National Sample Survey 2009-10, participating households report a mean
of only 37 days of work for all members of the household during that year, which is well
below the guaranteed 100 days. While this underutilization of the employment guarantee
could also reect low demand, work under the program is in fact rationed (Dutta et al.,
2012). A World Bank report notes that workers tend to wait passively to be recruited
rather than actively applying for work (The World Bank, 2011). During the agricul-
tural year 2009-10, 45% of Indian households wanted work under the act but only 25%
of Indian households beneted from the program.Despite rationing, the NREGA is well
targeted towards poorer households (Dutta et al., 2014). In 2009-2010, 42% of Scheduled
Tribes and 34% of Scheduled Caste households beneted from the program, against 15%
for general caste households.9 Because of its timing and its targeting, the NREGA may
oer an alternative to seasonal migration, which is a common income smoothing strategy
for poor households in India (Ashish and Bhatia, 2009; Morten, 2012).
7Worker controls include dummy variables for gender, age group, religion, caste group, education level
and marital status.
8A notable exception is rural Punjab (PJ), which is much richer than the average rural Indian district.
Punjab provides very little employment on public works, but given its high level of development it would
be predicted to provide even less of it, hence the positive residual.
9Author's calculations based on NSS Employment-Unemployment Survey (June 2009-July 2010).
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2.2 Data
The main obstacle to studying migration is the scarcity of reliable data. The migration
literature traditionally focuses on long-term migrants, who appear in population censuses.
Studying short-term migration is more challenging, as it requires dedicated data collection
eorts, which are often targeted to particular rural areas known to have high levels of
seasonal migration (Bryan et al., 2014; Imbert and Papp, 2018).
Our primary source of information is the Employment and Unemployment Survey
carried out by the National Sample Survey Organisation (here on, NSS Employment
Survey). The NSS Employment Survey is a nationally representative household survey,
which collects information on employment and wages in urban and rural areas, with one
specialized module whose focus changes from round to round. For the purpose of our
analysis, we use the 1999-00, 2004-05, 2007-08 and 2011-12 rounds, of which only the
1999-00 and 2007-08 rounds include questions on the migration history of each household
member. NSS surveys are conducted from July to June and are implemented in each
district throughout the year (National Sample Survey Oce, 2012).
Our analysis is at the individual level but the identifying variation is at the district-
level.10 The NSS Employment survey sample is stratied by urban and rural areas of
each district. Our sample includes 504 districts which represent 97.5% of the population
of India. It includes the twenty largest states of India, excluding Jammu and Kashmir.
We exclude Jammu and Kashmir since survey data is missing for some quarters due to
conicts in the area. The NSSO over-samples some types of households and therefore
provides sampling weights. All statistics and estimates computed using the NSS data are
adjusted using these sampling weights.11 Finally, the NSSO interviews the same number
of households in each strata during each quarter, so that the NSS Employment survey is
representative of district outcomes for the whole year.12
2.2.1 Short-term migration
In order to measure short-term migration, we use NSS Employment surveys 1999-00 and
2007-08, which are the only two recent rounds that include a migration module. For each
household member, NSS 2007-08 asks whether each household member has spent between
one and six months away from the village for work within the past year. We consider
as short-term migrant anybody who answered yes to this question. The questionnaire is
10 Districts are administrative units within states. The median district in our sample had a rural
population of 1.37 million in 2008 and an area of 1600 square miles (about 4100 square kilometers).
11See National Sample Survey Organisation (2008) and Appendix B for details on the construction of
sampling weights.
12 Since the quarterly samples are not randomly drawn, the NSS survey is not strictly speaking
representative at the district*quarter level.
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less straightforward in NSS 1999-00. First, each household member is asked whether she
stayed in the village for the last six months or more. If she answered positively, she is
then asked whether she spent two to six months away from the village for work within
the past year. We dene as short-term migrant anybody who answered either negatively
to the rst question or positively to the second, excluding people who have moved into
the household over the last six months (who changed their "usual place of residence").
The denition of short-term migration in NSS 1999-00 is more restrictive than in NSS
1999-00: trips shorter than two months that happened more than six months before the
survey would not be counted. For this reason, one would expect 2007-08 data to report
higher levels of short-term migration than 1999-2000, even if migration patterns had
not changed between the two periods.13 Indeed, the percentages of short-term migrants
among rural prime age adult is 2.6% in 1999-00 and 2.8% 2007-08.14National averages
mask a considerable amount of spatial heterogeneity. Figure 4 draws the map of short-
term out-migration across rural Indian districts. Short-term migration is not widespread,
with most districts having out-migration rates lower than 1%. It is highly concentrated
in poorer districts of the North-East (Bihar, Uttar Pradesh) and the West (Gujarat and
Rajasthan), which report migration rates above 5%.
As discussed above, NSS surveys are designed to have uniform coverage throughout
the year. If in practice the timing of the survey was not uniform, and if reported seasonal
migration varied during the survey year, then our measures of seasonal migration may be
biased.15 Appendix Figure A.1 suggests that survey coverage in rural areas was perfectly
uniform in NSS 2004-05 and 2007-08, but did uctuate slightly across quarters in NSS
1999-00, with a larger population covered in other states between July and September and
in star states between April and June. Appendix Figure A.2 shows that reported seasonal
migration declined throughout the survey year in NSS 1999-00, and was mostly stable in
NSS 2007-08. Hence the dierential coverage we observed in NSS 1999-00 should lead us
to overestimate short-term migration in other states and underestimate it in star states.
Since our empirical strategy (see below) compares changes in migration between the two
survey years in star versus non star states, the combination of these artifacts should lead
us to underestimate the relative drop in migration in star states, which would go against
us nding the eect we document.
Table 2 presents descriptive information about the migrants themselves. According
to NSS 1999-00 and 2007-08 data, short-term migrants are mostly male. They also are
13In their survey from Western India, Coey et al. (2015) nd 32% of adults were away from one to
six months in the last 12 months and 23% were away for two to six months.
14Authors calculation based on NSS Employment Surveys 1999-00 and 2007-08.
15Since seasonal migration uctuates from year to year (e.g. depending on the monsoon), reported
seasonal migration may vary within a survey year because the reporting window (last 12 months) shifts.
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younger than the average rural adult, but despite rising educational attainment in rural
India have lower literacy rates. They are more likely to report doing casual (i.e. manual,
unskilled) labor as their primary or secondary occupation. Finally, they are much more
likely to belong to Scheduled Tribes, and come from poorer households.
NSS 1999-00 has no information on migration trips, but NSS 2007-08 does record the
number of trips, the destination during the longest spell, and the industry in which they
worked. The destination is coded in seven categories: same district (rural or urban),
other district in the same state (rural or urban), another state (rural or urban), and
another country. 72% of rural short-term migrants go to urban areas, and 64% work in
construction or manufacturing. Importantly, 87% migrate to another district and 52% to
another state, which would often imply travelling long distances.16
2.2.2 Employment and wages
We further use NSS Employment Surveys to construct measures of employment and wages
at origin and destination. The NSS Employment Survey includes detailed questions about
the daily activities of all persons over the age of four in surveyed households for the past
seven days. We restrict the sample to persons aged 14 to 69. We then compute for
each person the percentage of days in the past seven days spent in each of six mutually
exclusive activities: public works, casual wage work, salaried wage work, self-employment,
unemployment and out of the labor force. The NSSO makes the distinction between two
types of wage work depending on the duration and formality of the relationship with the
employer: salaried work is long-term and often involves a formal contract, and casual
work is temporary and informal. In our analysis, we will focus on casual work, which is
the dominant form of employment for short-term migrants from rural areas. We compute
average earnings per day worked in casual labor (the casual wage) and in salaried work
(the salaried wage). Finally, in order to estimate the total number of workers engaged
in casual work in each district we use the NSSO question on the occupation of each
household member in the last year and categorize as casual worker every household
member who reports casual work as her principal or subsidiary occupation.
Estimated wage levels may be biased if the timing of the NSS survey was not uniform
and wages varied during the year. Appendix Figure A.4 shows that unlike rural areas,
NSS survey coverage in urban areas did vary across quarters even in 2004-05 and 2007-08.
There were also dierences across states, with a higher coverage in the January-March
period in 2004-05 for other states and in 2007-08 for star states. As Appendix Figure A.3,
16Highly subsidized train fares are instrumental in getting poor workers from remote rural areas to
seasonal jobs in urban centers. By contrast, rural workers who live close to a town may be able to
commute by road (Asher and Novosad, 2015).
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real wages increase throughout the survey year. Hence the increase in wages in cities of
star states relative to other states may be underestimated, which will likely play against
our nding that the NREGA increased urban wages.17
3 Model
In this section, we provide a conceptual framework to guide our empirical strategy. First,
we outline a model of migration from rural areas to urban areas. Second, we consider
the urban labor market equilibrium, and the eect of a change in migration from rural
areas. Third, we analyze the eect of a public works program that increases the value of
staying at home in some rural areas on urban labor markets. Finally, we derive the main
estimating equations that we use in our empirical analysis.
3.1 Location Choice
Let us consider a rural worker i who supplies inelastically one unit of labor in a location
j which is either home r or an urban destination u from a discrete set u ∈ {1, ..., U}. The
value of being in j is:
vij = Vrjεij = Ajwjτrjεij
where Aj denotes amenities of location j, wj the wage, τrj iceberg costs of migration (we
assume τrr = 1) and εij an individual and location specic utility term. We assume that
the idiosynchratic utility terms ε are drawn from a generalized extreme value distribution:









where θu and θr are dispersion parameters. Migrants are more sensitive to changes in
conditions at home than at destination (home biased preferences) if θr > θu.
18 The








Let Nr denote the population in rural origin r and Mru the number of migrants from
17Our strategy does not strictly compare urban wages trends in star versus other states (see below).
18This formulation is equivalent to a nested logit structure in which the upper nest is the decision of
relocating and the lower nest the choice of destination as in Monras (2018). Monras (2018) demonstrates
that the nested model is itself equivalent to a logit model with a xed cost to relocating.
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We can use 1 to compute µrru, the elasticity of migration w.r.t. the home wage, µ
u
ru, the
elasticity of migration w.r.t. the destination wage, and µu
′
ru the elasticity of migration
from r to u w.r.t. the wage in another urban destination u′ (see Appendix A):





3.2 Urban labor market equilibrium
Let us now consider urban areas. We assume that urban workers do not migrate to work
and inelastically supply Nu days of work.
19 Let Du denote labor demand in urban areas
and Mu denote the labor supply of rural migrants. Assuming that urban labor markets
are competitive and that residents and short-term migrants are perfect substitutes, the
urban wage wu clears the market:
20




Let us consider the eect of an exogenous change in migration inow from a rural origin
r. To simplify notation, let αru =
Mru
Nu
denote the ratio of labor supply from rural migrants
divided by the labor supply of urban workers. The higher αru, the more the urban center
relies on migrant labor from r to satisfy its demand for labor. Let ε denote the labor
demand elasticity, which we assume constant across urban areas. One can express ηru, the





















If the labor demand elasticity is negative, the elasticity of the urban wage with respect
to migration is itself negative, i.e. a decrease in migration from rural areas will increase
19According to NSS Employment Survey 2007-08, only 0.5% of urban adults were seasonal migrants.
20According to NSS Employment Survey 2007-08, only 3.9% of urban male adults were unemployed.
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urban wages. The elasticity of urban wages with respect to migration from r is decreasing
in αru, i.e. the more an urban area relies on migrant labor from a rural area r, the more
sensitive the wage will be to changes in migration inows coming from r.
A simple calibration exercise may give an idea of the magnitudes. As numerator, we
can use the estimated number of rural short-term migrants who worked in urban areas in
2007-08, which is 8 million. As denominator, we can use the number of urban adults who
declared doing casual labor as a primary or secondary occupation, which is 14.4 million.
But we also need to account the fact that seasonal migrants only work in urban areas for
part of the year. According to ARIS/REDS 2006 data, seasonal migrants who were away
from one to six months during the last year spent on average 104 days at destination.
Urban residents who did casual wage work as principal or secondary occupation supplied
on average 265 days of work per year (NSS 2007-08). This implies αru ≈ 0.22 for urban
India.21 Let us now assume that the labor demand elasticity is -0.3. Then for αru = 0.22
the elasticity of urban wages w.r.t. changes in short-term migration from rural areas is
-0.60, which is large, but in the same ballpark as other papers on internal migration in
developing countries (Kleemans and Magruder, 2014; Badaoui et al., 2014). By contrast,
in 2007-08 the number of rural adults who declared doing casual labor as a primary or
secondary occupation was 119 million, so that the elasticity of the rural wage w.r.t changes
in short-term migration to urban areas is small (-0.10). The elasticity of the rural wages
to rural-to-rural short-term migration (only 28% of the ows) is even smaller (-0.5). One
would hence expect small changes in seasonal migration to have large eects on urban
wages and little eect on rural wages. This is why this paper focuses on rural-to-urban
migration and on the urban labor market equilibrium.
3.3 Eect of the program
We now consider the equilibrium eects of a public works program that is implemented
in some rural areas r ∈ R1 but not implemented in other rural areas r ∈ R2. Consistent
with the empirical evidence, we assume that the program increases labor earnings in
rural areas R1 (Imbert and Papp, 2015).
22 We also assume that it has no direct eect
on urban areas or untreated rural areas R2. We use the subscript i ∈ {1, .., R} to denote
rural areas and j ∈ {1, .., U} to denote urban areas. To simplify notation we denote by
Mr total migration from r (i.e. Mr =
∑U
j=1Mru) and by αu the ratio of all migrants to




u). In Appendix A.3 we show that the program eect on
21Including casual work days by other urban residents, e.g. self-employed or salaried workers, does not
change this result. The probability that they did any casual work in a given week was lower than 0.1%.
22The NREGA increases the value of working in rural areas in two ways, by providing employment at
a wage higher than the prevailing wage, and by raising private sector wages (Imbert and Papp, 2015).
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The program eect can be decomposed in the following sequence. First, an increase in
wages in rural areas R1 reduces migration from rural areas R1 (rst term on the right
hand side of Equation 4). Second, the decrease in migration inow increases urban wages
(rst term on the right hand side of Equation 6). Third, the rise in urban wages attracts
more migrants from rural areas R2 (Equation 5), and mitigates the drop in migration
from rural areas R1 (second term on the right hand side of Equation 4). Fourth, the
migration response itself mitigates the rise in urban wages (θuαu in the denominators of
Equation 6). However, since urban areas are competing for migrants, the fact that urban
wages rise overall decrease migration to a particular destination, which increases urban
wages further (second term on the right hand side of Equation 6).
The unique objective of this model is to guide the empirical strategy to estimate
urban spillover eects, which we develop in the next sections. It does not explain why
the program increases rural wages (see Imbert and Papp (2015)). It does not cover
all possible ways in which the program may aect migration either: for example, an
employment guarantee may substitute for temporary migration as a risk coping strategy
(Morten, 2012). Finally, the model is not suited for a welfare analysis of the employment
guarantee. It does not factor in the value of rural public works as compared to the value
of the urban private employment they displace. It also does not take into account the
cost of migration for seasonal migrants who decide to stay at home and to forgo much
higher wages in the city (Imbert and Papp, 2018).
3.4 Empirical Strategy
For simplicity, let us assume that there are only two rural areas r ∈ {r1, r2}, such that
the program is implemented in r1 and not in r2, and two urban areas u ∈ {u1, u2}, such
that u1 is closer to r1 than to r2 and u2 is further away from r1 than from r2. The
standard approach to estimating empirically the program eect on migration from rural
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areas would be to compare changes in migration from rural areas with the program and
rural areas without the program.23 In the context of our model, this means comparing































Equation 7 makes it clear that, in the presence of spatial spillovers, dierence-in-dierences
will not in general identify the direct eect of the program on migration via an increase
in rural wages, but will also pick up changes in migration due to urban wage eects.
An important exception is if rural areas 1 and 2 have the same migration patterns at
baseline, which may be the case if they are randomly selected. In our case however, as
in most evaluations of place-based policies, areas with and without the program are not
equally distributed across space. In that case the dierence-in-dierences estimate will
be higher or lower than the direct eect, depending on the specic migration patterns
between rural areas with and without the program and urban areas.
Studies that are interested in spillover eects of rural policies or productivity shocks
on urban areas typically compare cities that are close to treated areas with cities that are
close to control areas.24 In the context of our model (see Appendix A.4), this approach
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This equation makes it clear that dierence-in-dierences will not in general identify
the eect of the program on urban area u1 through a change in migration from rural
area r1, because all rural and all urban areas may be aected by the program. One
exception is if spatial spillovers remain strictly local, e.g. if rural area r1 and urban area
u1 are so close to each other, and both so far from rural area r2 and urban area u2,
that no migrant from r1 goes to u2 and no migrant from r2 goes to u1. Then changes in
migration from r1 only impact u1, leaving wages in u2 and migration in r2 unchanged.
23This is the approach usually followed to identify the eect of place-based policies (Greenstone et al.,
2010; Dinkelman, 2011) or local labor demand shocks (Hornbeck, 2012; Autor et al., 2013). We followed
it ourselves to estimate the rural wage eects of the NREGA (Imbert and Papp, 2015)
24This is how for example Bustos et al. (2016) estimate the eect of agriculture productivity gains on
industry growth and Santangelo (2016) estimate the eect of the NREGA on manufacturing rms.
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In that case one can identify urban spillovers by comparing wage changes in u1 and u2
(see Appendix A.5 for more detail). In our context however, migration is not local: only
13% or seasonal migrants remain in the same district. Hence the dierence-in-dierences
estimates commonly used in the literature will be biased and will not yield the magnitude
of the program eects. They will be indicative of the sign of these eects as long as the
direct eect from rising rural wages is rst order relative to urban wage eects.
In the empirical part of this paper, we rst compare changes in migration rates from
rural areas with the program to changes in migration from rural areas without the pro-
gram, which is the reduced form equivalent of Equation 7. Second, we compare changes
in wages in urban areas that rely more or less on migration from rural areas with and
without the NREGA, which is the reduced form equivalent of comparing urban areas
with high and low αr1u and α
r2
u in Equation 8. Specically, we predict migration ows
based on a gravity model derived from equation 1 and baseline characteristics, and use
these predicted values to estimate equation 8. Finally, we use a structural estimation
based on Equations 4, 5 and 6 to recover the underlying parameters θ and ε. This allows
us to compute the direct and spillover eects of the program on migration and urban
wages, and to simulate its eect if it had been implemented uniformly across rural areas
r1 and r2.
4 Dierence-in-dierences
This section provides reduced form evidence on the spatial spill-over eects of the NREGA
in three steps. First, we compare changes in migration from rural areas with and without
the program. Second, we predict migration from each rural district to each city using
a gravity model of migration ows. Third, we compare changes in unskilled wages in
urban areas that attract more or fewer migrants from rural areas with and without the
program.
4.1 Program eect on migration
4.1.1 Empirical strategy
In order to estimate the impact of the program on migration and labor markets, we use
variation in NREGA implementation documented in Section 2. When the NSS Employ-
ment survey was carried out between July 2007 and June 2008, NREGA was supposed to
be implemented in 291 early districts.25 However, as discussed in Section 2, the quality of
25The NREGA was extended to late districts on April 1st 2008. We do not include late districts in
our analysis or rural outcomes. These districts have 18% higher casual wages and 40% lower short-term
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NREGA implementation varied across states, with seven "star states" providing most of
NREGA employment. Our empirical strategy builds on these observations and estimates
the impact of the program by comparing changes in employment and migration between
1999-00 and 2007-08 in early districts of star states with other early districts.26 Our
outcomes of interest are the number of days spent on public works per year, the daily
wage for casual work, and the fraction of adults who have done short-term migration
trips during the past year.
We implement a dierence-in-dierences strategy which compares changes in rural
outcomes in early districts of star states with changes in other early districts. Let Yirt be
the outcome for individual i in rural district of origin r in year t. Let Starr be a binary
variable equal to one for early districts of star states. Let Postt be a dummy variable
equal to one after 2007, once the program is implemented in early districts. Let Zr denote
a vector of district characteristics that do not vary with time, Xrt a vector of district
characteristics that do vary with time. District controls are listed in Table 1. Let Hi be a
vector of individual characteristics, including dummies for gender, education levels, caste,
religion and age ranges. Let ηt and µr denote time and district xed eects respectively.
We use data from NSS 1999-00 and 2007-08 and estimate the following equation:
Yirt = βStarr × Postt + δZr × Postt + γXrt + αHi + ηt + µr + εirt (9)
The main identifying assumption is that, absent NREGA, early phase districts of
star states would have experienced the same trends in outcomes as early phase districts
of other states. The three upper panels of Appendix Figure A.6 show trends in our
main outcomes. Public employment did increase somewhat more in Star States between
1999-00 and 2004-05. This reects the implementation of the National Food For Work
Program (FWP), a precursor of the NREGA, in November 2004.27 There is still however
a steep increase in public employment provision when the NREGA was implemented.
Reassuringly, there is no evidence of dierential wage trends before the NREGA was
implemented. Due to the lack of migration information in NSS 2004-05 and 2011-12,
we cannot show pre-program trends in short-term migration. There is however a clear
reversal between migration levels in star and non star states between 1999-00 and 2007-08.
To further probe the validity of the common trends assumption, we provide two
statistical tests. First, we test whether early districts in star and non-star states had
out-migration rates, they are hence less comparable to early districts.
26Our empirical strategy is dierent from the one we used in Imbert and Papp (2015), in which we
compare early and late phase districts. This is due to the fact that late phase districts have much lower
seasonal migration rates (about 0.82%), and can hence not be used as a comparison group.
27 Due to logistical issues, however, employment provision under the FWP was much lower than under
the NREGA and the program was discontinued (Dreze, 2005).
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dierent levels of outcomes before the program was implemented, and expect to nd no
signicant dierences between early districts of star states and non-star states. Using
data from NSS 1999-00, we estimate the following equation:
Yirt = βStarr + δZr + γXrt + αHi + εirt (10)
Second, we test whether early districts in star and non-star states had dierent trends
in outcomes before and after the program was implemented. For the pre-period, we
redene Postt is a dummy variable which equals to one after 2004 and estimate Equation
9 using data from NSS 1999-00 and 2004-05. For the post-period, we redene Postt as a
dummy variable which equals to one after 2011 and estimate Equation 9 using data from
NSS 2007-08 and 2011-12. We would expect no dierential trends in outcomes between
early districts of star and non-star states.28
4.1.2 Results
Estimates of the program's impact on public employment are presented in Panel A in
Table 3. In 1999-00, there are virtually no rural public works in early districts of non-star
states: rural adults spend 0.7 days on public works per year on average. Between 1999-
00 and 2007-08, public employment increased by 7.2 days more in early districts of star
states than in early districts of non-star states (column 1). When we include controls, the
coecient increases slightly to 7.4 days per adult per year (column 2). By contrast, we
nd no signicant dierences in employment provision between early districts of star and
non-star states in 1999-00, seven years before the NREGA was implemented (column 3).
Due to the FWWP program we mentioned above, we do nd a small increase (1.3 days per
adult per year) in public employment provision in early districts of star as compared to
non-star states between 1999-00 and 2004-05 (column 4). Finally, we estimate Equation
9 using data from 2007-08 and 2011-12, and nd no dierential change in employment
on rural public works after the initial roll-out (column 5). These results conrm that the
NREGA expanded dramatically employment on rural public works in early districts of
the seven star states between 2004-05 and 2007-08 (See Section 2.1). This is where we
expect to nd an impact on rural wages and short-term migration.
Estimates of the program impact on rural wages for casual labor are presented in Panel
B in Table 3. Estimates in column 1 show that between 1999-00 and 2007-08, wages for
unskilled, manual labor increased by 5.7% in early districts of star states, as compared
to early districts of non-star states. The coecient retains signicance and remains
28In Appendix Table A.6, we show that our results are also robust to excluding the last quarter of
NSS 2007-08 (April to June 2008), when the NREGA was rolled out everywhere.
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virtually unchanged when we control for heterogeneity among workers and dierences in
district characteristics, which shows that the increase in rural wages is not driven by the
selection of districts into the program (column 2). Column 3 shows that wage levels were
the same in star states in 1999-00, and column 4 shows that there was no dierence in
wage trends between star and non-star states between 1999-00 and 2004-5, before the
NREGA was implemented. Finally, we nd no dierence in wage trends between early
phase districts of star and non-star states between 2007-08 and 2011-12, i.e. after the
NREGA was rolled out (column 5). Taken together, these results provide solid evidence
that the NREGA increased private sector wages in rural areas, which we also found in
previous work (Imbert and Papp, 2015).
Finally, Panel C in Table 3 presents estimates of the program impact on short-term
migration. Columns 1 and 2 show that between 1999-00 and 2007-08, short-term mi-
gration decreased in early districts of star states, as compared to other early districts.
Once again, the inclusion of individual and district controls hardly changes the magnitude
of the coecient, if anything the estimated negative eect of the NREGA on seasonal
migration becomes larger. The coecients correspond to a 1.7 to 1.8 percentage point
decrease in the probability of migrating, which is a large decrease (about 50%) in the
prevalence of seasonal migration in early districts of star states (3.6% in 1999-00). Col-
umn 3 presents estimates of Equation 10 using data from July 1999 to June 2000 only.
There is no signicant dierence in the probability of migrating at baseline between star
and non-star states. This result provides reassurance that the relative decrease in migra-
tion in early districts of star states can be interpreted as a causal eect of the NREGA.29
Taken together, our ndings suggest that the NREGA increased the value of work in the
village and reduced seasonal migration from rural areas. As the theoretical framework
made clear, however, dierence-in-dierences estimates may be indicative of the sign of
the eects but would be biased in the presence of spatial spillovers. We provide structural
estimates of the direct and indirect eects of the program on migration in section 5 below.
4.2 Predicting short-term migration ows
According to the model (section 3.2), by reducing seasonal migration from rural areas,
the NREGA can have substantial eects on urban labor markets. In order to estimate
these eects, we rst need to predict short-term migration ows, and construct for each
urban center u the empirical counterpart of α1u and α
2
u, i.e. the number of rural migrants
from program and non-program districts as a share of the urban workforce.
29As explained above in section 2.2, there is no migration data for other years, which prevents us from
testing the parallel trends assumption before and after the NREGA is implemented.
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4.2.1 Strategy
Ideally, to predict exposure of urban areas to changes in seasonal migration due to the
NREGA, we would want to use a bilateral matrix of short-term migration ows before
the NREGA was implemented. Unfortunately, in 1999-00, the NSS Employment survey
did not collect any information on the destination of seasonal trips (see section 2.2). The
only information we have is from the NSS 2007-08 survey. It is incomplete: for each
district of origin we do not know the exact destination, but only the number of seasonal
migrants who went to the same district, to another district of the same state or to another
state. And it is collected after the NREGA was rolled out, which could have changed
migration patterns. We tackle these two data limitations in two separate steps. First, we
complete the migration matrix using information on long-term migration patterns from
the 2001 census. Second, we predict migration ows using a gravity model based on
district characteristics measured at baseline.
In order to construct a complete bilateral matrix of short-term migration ows, we rst
estimate the number of rural seasonal migrants from each early phase district who went
to an urban area in the same district, in another district of the same state or in another
state, according to NSS 2007-08. We then allocate these ows across urban districts, using
2001 Census data on the fraction of rural long-term migrants from the same district who
went to each urban district between 1991 and 2001, conditional on migrating to another
district in the same state or to another state. This provides an approximation of Mru,
the number of short-term migrants from rural parts of each district r to urban parts of
each district u in 2007-08.30
This procedure relies on the assumption that conditional on going to another district
of the same state or to leaving their state, short and long-term migrants choose similar
destinations, which can be justied by the role of employer, family, village and sub-caste
networks in "chain migration" (Card and DiNardo, 2000; Munshi, 2003). We provide
some evidence that this is a reasonable assumption using the 2006 ARIS-REDS survey,
which records both short and long-term migration ows for a representative sample of
Indian villages.31 Based on these data, we construct a bilateral matrix of short and long-
term migration ows at the origin×destination district level, and implement two tests.32
First, we regress short-term ows on long-term ows in REDS data. Second, we regress
30The details of our method are described in Appendix B.2.
31The 1999 ARIS-REDS survey did not collect information on short-term migration trips which pre-
vents us from using these data to compare short-term migration trends between star and non star states
before the NREGA. We provide more information on REDS data in Appendix B
32As Appendix FigureA.5 shows, short term migration is more geographically concentrated than long-
term migration, both in terms of origin (poorer, remote areas) and in terms of destinations (richer,
industrialized places). When focusing on the 25% largest long-term ows, however,long-term migrants
also seem to be attracted to richer, industrialized destinations.
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short-term ows in REDS data on migration probabilities from the Census 2001. In both
regressions, we include origin xed eects and control for whether origin and destination
are in the same district or in the same state. For robustness, we specify the outcome
variable either in log and use OLS or in levels and use Poisson regression. Despite the
small sample size - 57 origin×district pairs - the results shown in Appendix Table A.1 do
support the assumption that conditional on staying in the same state or going to another
state, short and long-term migrants from the same origin choose similar destinations.
We next predict migration ows based on district characteristics independent of the
NREGA. The estimating equation builds on Equation 1 and makes three simplifying
assumptions (see appendix A.6). First, we use population size Nu at baseline as a proxy
for amenities Au = N
γ0




ru × exp(γ2Iru + γ3SameStateru + γ4SameDistrictru)
where δru denotes distance between r and u, Iru is the probability that a worker taken
at random from r has a language in common with a worker taken at random from u,
SameStateru and SameDistrictru are dummy variables equal to one if r and u are in the
same state and the same district, respectively. Finally, since the probability of migration




rj ≈ V θrr. Then equation 1 becomes:
ln(Mru) ≈ β1 ln(δru) + β2Iru + β3SameStateru + β4SameDistrictru
+ β5 ln(Nu) + β6 ln(wu) + β7 ln(Nr) + β8 ln(wr) + εru (11)
In order to minimize endogeneity concerns, we use measures of population and wages
at origin and destination from the NSS employment survey 1999-2000, long before the
NREGA was implemented. The model is estimated using Poisson-quasi maximum likeli-
hood, which has the advantage of taking into account pairs of districts with no migrants,
and has been shown to perform well for gravity models (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).
Finally, we construct for each urban center the empirical counterparts of α1u and α
2
u
in our theoretical framework, i.e. the measure of exposure to changes in migration from
program and non program districts. Let M̂ru denote the predicted short-term migration
from rural district r to urban district u from estimating Equation 11. Let Lu denote








r/∈StarEarly M̂ru × 104
Lu × 265
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where α̂1u and α̂
2
u are the predicted seasonal migration inow into district u coming from
early districts of star states and from early districts of other states respectively. We
take the ratio between seasonal migrant numbers Mru multiplied by the number of days
they spend on average at destination (from 2006 ARIS-REDS data), and the estimated
number of casual workers living in u multiplied by the estimated number of days they
spend doing casual work per year (from NSS 2007-08).
4.2.2 Results
We rst estimate equation 11 to predict migration ows between rural-urban district
pairs. As Table 4 shows, the determinants of migration all have a signicant impact on
migration ows, and their coecients have the expected signs. Distance negatively aects
the number of migrants. Wages at destination and origin have a positive and negative
impact on migration, respectively. We predict more migration between districts with a
larger number of casual workers. Migrants are more likely to go to districts where more
people have a language in common with them. Interestingly, rural short-term migrants
are no more likely to migrate to urban centers in the same state, and less likely to
migrate in the same district. This suggests that political borders per se do not matter for
seasonal migrants, maybe because unlike long-term migrants they do not rely on state-
specic benets or jobs at destination (Kone et al., 2016).33 These eects are robust to
the model used, and to dierent denitions of the outcome variable.
We next use predicted migration ows to compute the two ratios α1 and α2, which
measure the importance of migration ows from early districts in star states and from
other rural districts respectively, as a fraction of the urban casual labor force. Table 5
presents the weighted average of these estimates for each state. On average, urban areas of
star states are more likely to receive migrants from early districts of star states than urban
areas of other states (the migration rates are 7% and 4% respectively). Conversely, urban
areas of other states are more likely to receive migrations from early districts of other
states than urban areas of star states (the migration rates are 20% and 6% respectively).
There is, however, a fair amount of heterogeneity due to the fact that half of short-
term migrants cross state borders. Many star states (e.g. Himachal Pradesh or Madhya
Pradesh) receive a large share of migrants from early districts of other states, and some
other states (e.g. Delhi or Haryana) have high levels of migration from early districts of
star states. In the next section, we use this geographical variation at the district level to
estimate the impact of changes in migration due to the NREGA on urban wages.
33Our method to impute the destination of short-term migrants in NSS 2007-08 using long-term mi-
grants in the 2001 Census does allow them to have dierent propensity to stay in the same district or in
the same state (see previous section).
22
Before we proceed to the next part of the analysis, two issues deserve discussion.
First, because of measurement error in the denominator, some small urban districts have
implausibly high values of α̂1 and α̂2 (up to 14 and 34 respectively). To reduce the
inuence of these outliers in our regression analysis, we winsorize the top one percent of
the distribution of α̂1 and α̂2, which amounts to topcoding 4 districts out of 476. Second,
the gravity model which we use to predict migration ows includes destination wages at
baseline. This raises the concern that our migration predictions are endogenous to the
urban wage trends which we want to explain. As robustness check, we estimate urban
wage eects using migration predictions which are not based on wages at destination.
4.3 Program eect on labor markets
4.3.1 Strategy
In order to estimate the eect of the NREGA on urban labor markets, we compare
changes in labor market outcomes in cities that rely more on short-term migration from
rural areas where the program is implemented (high α1u) to outcomes in cities for which
migration is less important relative to the resident casual workforce (low α1u). For a
given level of α1u, we further compare urban centers that attract migrants from rural
areas without the program (high α2u) to other cities. We predict that, as compared to
the average urban center, wages will increase in cities that rely more on migrants coming
from rural areas where the program reduces migration, and decrease in cities that rely
more on migrants coming from rural areas where the program is not implemented. We
estimate the following equation by ordinary least squares:
Yut = β0 + β1α̂1u × Postt + β2α̂2u × Postt
+ δZu × Postt + γXut + αHi + ηt + µu + εut (12)
where Yut are wages earned by urban worker u deated using urban prices.
34 As before
Postt is a dummy variable equal to one after 2007, once the program is implemented
in early districts, Zu denotes a vector of district characteristics that do not vary with
time, Xut a vector of district characteristics that do vary with time. District controls
are listed in Panel A of Table 1. Hi is a vector of individual characteristics, including
dummies for gender, education levels, caste, religion and age ranges. ηt and µu denote
time and district xed eects respectively. For inference purposes, we need to account
both for the fact that regressors α̂1u and α̂
2
u are estimated from equation 11 and that error
34We use the state-level price index for industrial laborers published by the Labour Bureau
(http://labourbureaunew.gov.in).
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terms in equation 12 are likely correlated within district. Bootstrapped standard errors
are obtained by repeating the estimation of models 11 and 12 on random district draws
(with replacement).
A potential threat to our identication strategy is that urban centers that hire more
migrants from early districts of star states may be on dierent economic trends, and hence
would exhibit dierential changes in labor market outcomes even without the NREGA.
The raw trends, shown in the bottom two panels of Appendix Figure A.6, are very
reassuring in that regard. Urban districts with high and low predicted migration from
star states ( α̂1u) have very similar trends between 1999-00 and 2004-05, but in 2007-08
wages suddenly grow faster in districts with a higher α̂1u. Similarly, urban districts with
high and low predicted migration from other states (α̂2u) exhibit parallel trends until the
NREGA is implemented, when wage growth in districts with a higher α̂2u slows down. We
provide a statistical test of the existence of dierential trends by estimating two placebo
regressions, one using 1999-00 and 2004-05 data, before the NREGA was implemented,
and another using 2007-08 and 2011-12 data, i.e. after the NREGA was rolled out across
India.
Another concern is that the states' decision to actively implement the NREGA may
have been related to other state-level policies or economic trends which would also aect
urban wages. To alleviate this concern, we take advantage of the fact that most seasonal
migrants go beyond district and state borders, so that urban areas with high predicted
migration from early districts of star states are not all in early districts, or even in star
states. Specically, we estimate equation 12 including dummies for early districts, star
states, and early districts of star states interacted with Postt. This robustness check also
allows us to check that our ndings are not driven by other eects of public employment
provision on the local urban economy (e.g. higher consumption or investment).35
4.4 Results
Table 6 presents the estimated eect of the NREGA on urban wages. We nd that
between 2004-05 and 2007-08, urban centers with higher predicted migration rates from
early districts of star states experienced a relative increase in wages. The estimated
coecient with controls suggests that in an urban district with a 10% higher migration
rate from early districts in star states, wages would have risen by 4.8% more. We also
nd evidence of a mitigating impact through increased migration from rural districts
that do not have the program. For a given migration rate from early districts of star
states, an urban center with a 10% higher migration rate from other early districts would
35In Appendix Table A.6, we show that our results are also robust to excluding the last quarter of
NSS 2007-08 (April to June 2008), when the NREGA was rolled out everywhere.
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have had a 0.7% lower wage growth. As table 5 shows, in the average urban district,
the predicted migration rate from early districts of star states is 5% and the predicted
migration rate from other early districts is 16%. Hence our estimates imply that for the
average urban district the increase in wages (+2.4%) caused by a drop in migration from
program districts was partially mitigated by an increase in migration from non-program
districts (-1.1%). The net eect is a 1.3% increase in urban wages.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 present the results of the rst set of robustness checks.
Reassuringly we nd no evidence that the wage trends we document in cities with high
migration from early districts of star or non-star states were present before or after the
NREGA was rolled out. However, despite the fact that the raw trends seemed parallel
(see Appendix Figure A.6), there is some evidence that urban districts with high migra-
tion from early districts of star states had lower wage growth before the NREGA was
implemented. This raises the concern that our estimates pick up a temporary catch up
(Ashenfelter dip). To alleviate this concern, we implement a second robustness check,
and estimate our main specication controlling for the pre-NREGA wage trend interacted
with time. The results, presented in Appendix Table A.3, suggest that our results are not
driven by pre-existing trends. These robustness checks provide some reassurance that our
ndings are not driven by economic shocks or policies correlated with NREGA implemen-
tation. Appendix Table A.3 present the results of the third robustness check. Wages did
rise faster in urban areas of early districts and of star states between 2004-05 and 2007-08.
However, even controlling for these trends we nd that urban areas with higher predicted
migration from early districts of star states experienced faster wage growth. This sug-
gests that because of the relatively long distances traveled by short-term migrants, the
spillover eects of the program on urban labor markets were not limited to districts or
states with high NREGA employment. This alleviates the concern that states decided to
implement the NREGA based on its expected eect on urban areas. This also suggests
that the wage eects we document were due to reduced migration and not to rising local
demand for urban goods (Santangelo, 2016). As a fourth robustness check, we exclude
destination wages from the gravity model and use these migration predictions instead:
the estimated eects on urban wages are very similar (see Appendix Table A.4).36 Fi-
nally, we also nd similar results if we exlude the last quarter of the NSS 2007-08 survey,
which corresponds to the time when the NREGA was rolled out in all rural districts (see
Appendix Table A.6)
36We also test whether the wage eects are concentrated in the peak migration season (January to
June) by interacting the alpha*post dummies with two dummies for each half of the year. The estimates,
presented in Appendix Table A.5 suggest that the urban wage eects are not signicantly dierent across
seasons. The results may not be however very reliable, given the uctuations in NSS coverage for urban
areas we document in Appendix Figure A.4.
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5 Structural estimates
Our reduced form estimates suggest that the NREGA reduced seasonal migration and
increased urban wages. We also nd that the urban wages eects were not limited to
program districts but were geographically widespread. This raises the possibility that
non-program districts were indirectly aected, so that dierence-in-dierences estimates
are biased (see section 3). In this section, we derive from the model two structural
equations that allow us to quantify the direct and indirect eects of the program.
5.1 Strategy
In appendix A.7, we derive from the model the two following equations:
∆m = θua∆wu − θr∆wr (13)
∆wu = [Iu − θuφ(θu, ε)b]−1θrφ(θu, ε)∆wr (14)
where the three parameters of interest are θu, the migration response parameter w.r.t.
destination wages, θr the migration response parameter w.r.t. wages at origin, and ε,
the labor demand elasticity in urban areas. ∆m is the vector of observed changes in
migration from rural districts, ∆wr is the vector of observed changes in casual wages in
rural districts weighted by the probability of not migrating (pii), and ∆wu is the vector
of observed changes in casual wages in urban districts.37 Iu is the identity matrix. The
two matrices a and b can be constructed based on observed migration patterns. φ is a
























where pji denotes the probability of migrating from rural district i to urban district j, p
i
i
is the probability of staying in i, αj is the in-migration rate for urban destination j and
αij is the in-migration of migrants from rural district i into urban destination j.
We next translate equations 13 and 14 into a system of equations that we can use
to estimate the three structural parameters θu,θr and ε. Let i ∈ {1, R} denote a rural
district and j ∈ {1, U} denote an urban district. ∆mi is the change in migration from i,
∆wri the change in casual wages in i and ∆
wu
j the change in casual wages in j between
37All three vectors are normalized using the sample average.
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i + Cu + εj (16)
where Cr and Cu are two constants which need to be estimated, and εi and εj are normally
distributed error terms. pii, p
j
i , αj and α
i
j are all based on the migration matrix in 2007-08.
Equation 15 is linear in the paramaters, and pins down θu and θr. Equation 16 is
non linear, but pins down ε once θu and θr known. We address the endogeneity in ∆
wr
using the implementation of the NREGA as an instrument. Specically, let Tr denote a
vector of dummy variables equal to one for star states weighted by the probability of not
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i )− ε(1 + α̂j)
Identication relies on the model structure and on three assumptions. The rst two were
already needed in the reduced form approach: we assume that NREGA implementation
is exogenous with respect to rural out-migration and that migration patterns predicted
by the gravity model are exogenous with respect to changes in rural or urban outcomes.
We make an additional assumption, that urban wage changes are exogenous with respect
to changes in out-migration from a given rural origin. Since rural migrants go to cities
far away, migration from a single district will have little impact on urban labor markets.
The structural estimation allows us to go beyond the dierence-in-dierences estimates
of the program impact, which are likely to be biased if non-program areas are aected
by the program (see section 3). Based on our estimates, we can quantify the eect of
the program on migration from both program and non-program areas, and the resulting
impact on urban wages. Let β̂ denote the estimated program eect on rural wages in
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early districts of star states from equation 9. The estimated eects of the program on
migration and urban wages are given by the following expressions:
∆̂m = −θ̂rβ̂Tr + θ̂u
(





[Iu − θ̂uφ̂(θ̂u, ε̂)̂b]−1θ̂rφ̂(θ̂u, ε̂)
)
β̂Tr (18)
where the rst term on the right hand-side of equation 17 is the direct impact of the
program on migration through a change in rural wages, and the second term is the indirect
impact, through a change in urban wages. We also simulate the eect of the NREGA on
migration and wages if the program had been implemented in all early districts with the
same eect on rural wages, by replacing Tr in equations 17 and 18 with a vector of ones.
5.2 Results
Panel A in Table 7 presents our estimates. The estimated parameter which governs
the migration response w.r.t. wages at destination is a highly signicant 2.4, which also
implies and elasticitiy of 2.4. Our point estimate is strikingly close to Monras (2018)'s 2.56
estimate of the same structural parameter for internal migration the US. The estimated
parameter which governs the migration response to wages at home is also highly signicant
and larger in magnitude 5.76, which suggests that migrants are indeed more sensitive to
wages at home than at destination (home bias), even when one takes into account the
fact that they are more likely to stay at home in general (pii in the model). The implied
migration elasticity w.r.t. wages at home is −5.6. In a companion paper (Imbert and
Papp 2018), we show that once living costs and income risk are taken into account the
dierence between earnings per day migrated and daily NREGA earnings in the village
is only 14%. Hence an increase by 14% in rural wages may go a long way into closing
the gap between earnings in the village and in urban areas, which is consistent with
our migration elasticity estimate w.r.t wages at home that migration should decrease by
14 × −5.6 = −78%. The point estimate for ε is negative and reasonable in magnitude
(−0.22), but insignicantly dierent from zero, which may be due to its estimation from a
non-linear function. In what follows, we will use the point estimates, with the caveat that
these results can only be suggestive of the actual magnitudes. As we will see however,
the implied migration and urban wage eects match our reduced form estimates quite
well.
We next turn to the program impact on migration and urban wages implied by our
estimates, using equations 17 and 18. As Panel B shows, migration from early districts
of star states experienced a large decline due to the increase in rural wages: about -
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22%. But at the same time, migration from early districts of other states increased
by about 5%, in response to a change in urban wages. Hence dierence-in-dierences
estimates which would compare changes in migration in rural districts with and without
the program would be about -27%, which is in the same ballpark as the reduced form
estimates presented in section 4.1. Interestingly, these dierence-in-dierences estimates
would overestimate the negative eect of the program on migration by 20%. Finally, our
calibration shows that because the increase in migration from other states compensated
the decline in migration from star staets, the inationary eect of the NREGA on urban
wages has been relatively small, about 0.5%. Once again, the structural results are
consistent both qualitatively and quantitatively with the reduced form estimates (see
section 4.3).
Finally, we simulate the eect of the program in the counterfactual case where all dis-
tricts selected for the early implementation phase of the NREGA had indeed implemented
the program. We assume that they would then have all experienced a 5.7% increase in
rural wages, which is the estimated eect for early districts of star states from section
4.1. As panel C shows, migration from early district would then have decreased by 11%
overall, and urban wages would have increased by 4.1%. These estimates suggest that
the eects of the program would have been much more dramatic if all early districts had
implemented the program as in star states: they are close to the estimated eect of the
program on rural wages (Imbert and Papp, 2015). This is both because the direct nega-
tive eect of the program on migration would have been larger and because the indirect
mitigating eect of increased migration would have been weaker.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence on the eect of a large rural development program,
India's NREGA on migration from rural to urban areas and on urban labor markets.
Among rural districts that were selected to receive the program (early districts), we
compare those where it was well implemented (star states) with the others, and nd
evidence that the NREGA increased rural wages and reduced short-term migration to
urban areas. By comparing urban areas with higher/ lower migration rate from star
states, we show that the decline in migration from program areas increased urban wages.
We also nd evidence of slower wage growth in cities that usually attract migrants from
rural areas where the program was not implemented (other states).
A spatial equilibrium model suggests that in presence of far-reaching spatial spillovers,
dierence-in-dierences estimates may be informative about the sign of the eect of the
program on migration, but provide unreliable quantitative estimates. To address this
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issue, we derive and estimate a structural model which takes into account both the direct
and the spillover eects of the program. We estimate elasticities of seasonal migration
with respect to wages at home and at destination, which are signicant and large (-5.6 and
2.4 respectively). They suggests that seasonal migrants are highly responsive to changes
in earnings opportunities at origin and destination. We also estimate an urban labor
demand elasticity which is reasonable in magnitude (−0.21), but imprecisely estimated.
We then use structural estimates to recover the direct and spillover eects of the pro-
gram on migration, and to simulate the eect of the program if it had been implemented
in all rural areas selected to receive it. We nd that not only did migration from program
areas decline (by 22%) but migration from non-program areas also increased substantially
(5%), so that dierence-in-dierences overestimate the program eect on migration (by
about 20%). The migration response from non-program areas mitigated the negative
eect of the program on rural-to-urban migration and hence mitigated its inationary
eect on urban wages, which was only +0.5%. In contrast, urban wages would have
increased by 4.1% if the program had been eectively rolled out in all districts selected
to implement it.
Our results show that spatial spillover eects are not only qualitatively, but also
quantitatively important in the evaluation of place-based policies. Our method also
demonstrates how to leverage the structure of economic interactions between geographic
units to estimate spillovers in the case where they are not strictly local.
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Figure 1: Cross-state variation in public employment provision
Figure 2: Unexplained cross-state variation in public employment provision
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Figure 3: Map of star states
Other States
Star States
Figure 4: Map of seasonal migration rates across rural districts
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Table 1: Characteristics of early districts in star and in other states (district controls)
Star States Other States p-value Source Time-varying?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Controls for rural and urban areas
Literacy Rate 57% 54% 0.06 2001 Census No
Fraction Scheduled Castes (SC) 16% 18% 0.16 2001 Census No
Fraction Scheduled Tribes (ST) 23% 15% 0.00 2001 Census No
Log Population Density (per sq. km) 0.69 1.41 0.00 2001 Census No
Log Daily Wage for Salaried Labor 4.60 4.60 0.94 NSS 1999-00 No
Employment Share in Agriculture 57% 43% 0.00 NSS 1999-00 No
Employment Share in Construction 3% 2% 0.03 NSS 1999-00 No
Employment Share in Manufacturing 4% 4% 0.83 NSS 1999-00 No
Employment Share in Services 6% 7% 0.09 NSS 1999-00 No
Poverty Rate in 2004-05 (Tendulkar Poverty Line) 42% 46% 0.08 NSS 2004-05 No
Agricultural Productivity p.c. in 2004-05 7.81 7.52 0.00 Ag. Ministry No
Election Year in 2007-08 44% 16% 0.00 Gov Website Yes
Alignment State-Central Government (2007-08) 37% 48% 0.07 Gov Website Yes
Panel B: Controls for rural areas only
Fraction of Villages accessed by Paved Road 63% 64% 0.69 2001 Census No
Fraction of Villages with Bus Service 55% 41% 0.00 2001 Census No
Fraction of Villages with Education Facility 97% 92% 0.00 2001 Census No
Fraction of Villages with Medical Facility 58% 46% 0.00 2001 Census No
Fraction of Villages with Post and Telecom Facility 65% 56% 0.00 2001 Census No
Fraction of Villages with Bank Facility 19% 17% 0.41 2001 Census No
Fraction of Villages with Electricity 94% 73% 0.00 2001 Census No
Irrigated Cultivable Land per Capita (ha) 0.10 0.07 0.00 2001 Census No
Non irrigated Cultivable Land per Capita (ha) 0.25 0.18 0.01 2001 Census No
Cumulative Rainfall (normalized) in 2007-08 0.10 0.75 0.00 TRMM Yes
Log p.c. Spending on Rural Roads Program (2007-08) 2.49 1.52 0.00 Gov Website Yes
Log p.c. Spending on Watershed Programs (2007-08) 3.66 1.94 0.00 Gov Website Yes
Number of District Observations 93 198
Number of Individual Observations (rural only) 34409 84900
Notes: This table presents means of the controls used in the paper. Only rural areas of early phase districts are used. Column (1)  restricts the sample 
to early districts of star states. Star states include Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan, and 
Uttarkhand. Column (2) includes early districts in non-star states. Column (3) presents the p-values of the Student's t-test of equality of means in 
Column (1) and (2). The details of the construction of each control are given in Appendix B. For the Student's t-test in column (3) standard errors are 
computed assuming correlation of individual observations over time within each district.
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Table 2: Short-term migration patterns
All Migrants All Migrants
Short-term migrant? 2.77% 100% 3.52% 100%
Female 50% 36% 50% 13%
Age 18 to 30 63% 67% 52% 54%
Age 31 to 40 11% 10% 15% 18%
Illiterate 41% 49% 39% 53%
Primary education or below 25% 25% 24% 26%
Casual work as primary or secondary occupation 23% 21% 21% 24%
Scheduled Caste 14% 27% 14% 22%
Scheduled Tribe 33% 55% 30% 74%
Log deflated household monthly p.c. expenditure 3.14 3.07 4.93 4.77
Number of migration spells - - - 2.22
Destination is in same district - - - 13%
Destination is in another district of the same state - - - 34%
Destination is in another state - - - 52%
Destination is urban - - - 72%
Worked in agriculture - - - 20%
Worked in manufacturing and mining - - - 18%
Worked in construction - - - 46%
Worked in other sector (including services) - - - 15%
Observations 131920 3763 119309 10311
Source: NSS Employment-Unemployment Survey Round 55 and 64. The sample is 
composed of rural prime-age adults of early phase districts. Each statistic is computed using 
sampling weights.
Year   1999-2000 Year   2007-08
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Public Employment
Star State X Post 7.175*** 7.438*** 1.275** -1.907
(1.483) (1.426) (0.498) (1.778)
Star State -0.568
(0.540)
Mean in non Star States (1999-00) 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.82
Observations 251,229 251,229 131,920 248,975 206,025
Panel B: Log Casual Wages
Star State X Post 0.0569** 0.0551* 0.0108 0.0107
(0.0286) (0.0319) (0.0324) (0.0234)
Star State 0.0386
(0.0296)
Mean in non Star States (1999-00) 2.38 2.38 2.38 2.38 2.38
Observations 52,652 52,652 27,237 44,553 36,986
Panel C: Short-term Migration




Mean in non Star States (1999-00) 2.53 2.53 2.53
Observations 251,229 251,229 131,920
Workers Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effect Yes Yes No Yes Yes
The sample is composed of rural adults from early phase districts surveyed in NSS: (i) from July 1999 to 
June 2000 and July 2007 to June 2008 (Column 1 and 2), (ii) from July 1999 to June 2000 (Column 3), (iii) 
from July 1999 to June 2000 and July 2004 to June 2005 (Column 4) (iv) from July 2007 to June 2008 and 
from July 2011 to June 2012 (Column 5). The unit of observation is a rural adult. Each column presents 
results from a separate regression. All specifications include quarter fixed effects. In Panel A the outcome is 
the estimated number of days spent on public works per adult per year. In Panel B the outcome is log 
deflated daily wages for casual labor. In Panel C the outcome is a binary variable which is equal to 100 if 
workers have spent one to six months away from work during the last year and zero otherwise. Star state is a 
dummy variable equal to one for Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, 
Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and Uttarkhand. Worker controls include a set of dummy variable for age group, 
gender, education level, social group and religion. District Controls are presented in Table 1. In column 1 
and 2 Post is a time dummy equal to one for the period 2007-08.  In column 4 Post is a time dummy equal to 
one for the period 2004-2005. In column 5 Post is a time dummy equal to one for the period 2011-2012.  
Standard errors are clustered at the district level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 
percent level. 
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Log Destination Casual Deflated Wage 0.396***
(0.130)
Log Origin Casual Deflated Wage -0.543***
(0.188)
Log Destination Population 0.883***
(0.0520)










Notes: Estimates of a poisson regression. The unit of observation is a pair between the rural part of an early 
district and the urban part of a district. The outcome is the number of migrants going from one to another at 
baseline, constructed using NSS 2007-08 and 2001 census data (see Appendix B.2). The specification is 
described in section 4.2.1. All estimates are computed without sampling weights. Standard errors in 
parentheses are adjusted for correlation of the errors between state pairs. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. 
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Table 5: Predicted migration rate from rural areas with and without NREGA employment
Number of rural migrants from 
early districts of star states*104   
Number of rural migrants from 
early districts of other states *104 
Number of urban resident casual 
workers * 265
Number of  urban resident casual 
workers * 265



























Column 1 present the ratio between the number of rural migrants from early districts of star states doing short-term 
trips to urban parts of a given state multiplied by the number of days rural migrants spend at destination and the 
number of casual workers living in these urban areas multiplied by the number of days that these workers spend doing 
casual wage work. Column 2 presents the ratio between the number of rural migrants from other rural districts doing 
short-term trips to urban parts of a given state multiplied by the number of days rural migrants spend at destination and 
the estimated number of casual workers living in these urban areas  multiplied by the number of days that these 
workers spend doing casual wage work.  Rural to urban migration flows are predicted using the gravity model 
presented in Table 4. Casual workers are prime-age adults who declared doing casual wage work as usual principal or 
subsidiary occupation in NSS 2007-08. The number of days spent at destination by rural seasonal migrants is estimated 












































Table 6: Impact of the NREGA on urban wages
1999-00      
2004-05
2007-08   
2011-12
(1) (2) (3) (4)
       * Post 0.598*** 0.479*** -0.278* -0.01
(0.208) (0.189) (0.164) (0.216)
       * Post -0.091** -0.072** 0.036 -0.014
(0.042) (0.036) (0.032) (0.043)
Observations 16338 16338 20301 14598
Workers Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
2004-05                                 
2007-08
Log Real Casual Wages
Each column presents results from a separate regression. The outcome is log deflated 
casual earnings. All specifications include district and year fixed effects. The sample is 
composed of urban adults surveyed in NSS: (i) from July 2004 to June 2005 and July 
2007 to June 2008 (Column 1 and 2), (ii) from July 1999 to June 2000 and July 2004 to 
June 2005 (Column 3) (iii) from July 2007 to June 2008 and from July 2011 to June 
2012 (Column 4). In Panel A the sample is restricted to early districts. In Panel B and C 
it excludes early districts. Star state is a dummy variable equal to one for Andhra 
Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and 
Uttarkhand. In column 1 and 2 Post is a time dummy equal to one for the period 2007-
08.  In column 3 Post is a time dummy equal to one for the period 2004-2005. In column 
4 Post is a time dummy equal to one for the period 2011-2012.  District Controls are 
presented in Table 1. Worker controls include a set of dummy variable for age group, 
gender, education level, social group and religion. Standard errors are clustered at the 




Table 7: Structural estimates and calibration of the eect of the NREGA on migration
and urban wages
Panel A: Estimation of model parameters
Migration response parameter w.r.t. wages at home (θr) 5.76
(1.35)
[2.79;8.36]
Migration response parameter w.r.t. wages at destination  (θu) 2.41
(0.85)
[0.91;4.34]
Urban labor demand elasticity (ε ) -0.22
(0.66)
[-1.96;0.18]
Panel B: Program effects, actual implementation
Effect on rural wages, early districts of star states 5.7%
Effect on rural wages, early districts of other states 0.0%
Effect on migration, early districts of star states -22.6%
Effect on migration, early districts of other states 4.6%
Difference-in-differences estimate -27.2%
Bias of the difference-in-differences estimate 20.2%
Effect on urban wages 0.5%
Panel C: Program effects, full implementation
Effect on rural wages, early districts of star states 5.7%
Effect on rural wages, early districts of other states 5.7%
Effect on migration, early districts of star states -11.8%
Effect on migration, early districts of other states -10.4%
Effect on urban wages 4.1%
Notes: Panel A presents the results of the estimation of the migration response 
parameter w.r.t. wages at origin (θr) and at destination (θu) for a given value of 
the elasticity of urban wages w.r.t. migration (ε ). Bootstrapped standard errors are 
shown in parentheses and 5% confidence intervals in brackets. Panel B presents 
the results of the calibration of the program effects, using the increase in rural 
wages in early districts of star states estimated in Table 3 and the model 
parameters in Panel A. Panel C presents the results of a counterfactual calibration, 
assuming that the program is implemented in all early districts and has the same 
effect on rural wages as estimated in Table 3.
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FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION ONLY
A Theoretical Appendix
A.1 Migration elasticity
We show how we can use 1 to compute µrru, the elasticity of migration from r to u with
respect to the home wage, µuru, the elasticity of migration from r to u with respect to
the destination wage and µu
′
ru, the elasticity of migration from r to u w.r.t. the wage in













































A.2 Urban wage elasticities
We consider an urban labor market u, and use Du to denote labor demand, Nu labor
supply of urban residents and Mru labor supply of migrants from rural area r. Let α
r
u
denote the migration rate from r, i.e. the ratio between the labor supply of migrants




u denote the total
migration rate from all rural origins. The labor market clearing condition writes:










Let ε denote the urban labor demand elasticity, The elasticity of the urban wage wu in























Since ε is negative, ηru is also negative, i.e. an increase in migration from rural area r
decreases wages in urban destination u. The eect is larger, the higher the migration
rate from rural area r (αru), and the lower the migration rate from all rural areas (αu).
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A.3 Program eect
We now consider the eect of a change in wages in some rural areas r ∈ R1 due to the
implementation of a public works program. A change in wages will aect migration from
rural to urban areas and urban wages.
Let us rst consider changes in migration to destination u from rural areas with the


























j=1Mrj denote total migration from a given rural area r. Aggregating over






















































































































































































We now assume that there are two rural areas r1 and r2, and two urban areas u1 and u2,
such that the program is implemented in r1 but not in r2, u1 is closer to r1 than r2 and
u2 is closer to r2 than r1. In this section we show how to derive the two dierence-in-
dierences estimates expressed by equations 7 and 8.
We rst consider the eect of the program on migration from rural areas and take
the dierence between the change migration rate in r1 and in r2. It can derived by




























We next consider the eect of the program on wages in urban areas and take the dierence
between the change in the wage in u1 and in u2. This can be obtained by substracting








θuαu1 − ε(1 + αu1)
−
αr1u2

















θuαu1 − ε(1 + αu1)
−
αr2u2








A.5 Local spatial spillovers
Spatial spillovers are local when migrants from rural areas 1 only go to urban areas 1 and
migrants from rural areas 2 only go to urban areas 2:






This implies that migrants from rural area 1 (resp. 2) do not respond to changes in wages
in urban area 2 (resp. 1), and that wages in urban area 1 (resp. 2) do not respond to


























When spatial spillovers are local, dierence-in-dierences correctly identify the impact
of the program on migration from rural areas 1. As equation 19 shows, this eect can
be decomposed into a direct eect, from rising rural wages in r1 and an indirect (or
equilibrium) eect, from rising urban wages in u1.
























When spillovers are only local, comparing changes in wages from urban areas 1 and 2
does yield the program eect on urban wages.
A.6 Gravity equation
We show here how to derive from the model the gravity equation 11 which we use to
predict migration ows. We start with equation 1:















where prr is the probability that a worker from r stays at home. Equation 1 becomes:
ln(Mru) = θu ln(Vru)− θr ln(Vrr) + ln(prr) + ln(Nr)
We make three simplifying assumptions. First, the probability of migration is low, about
0.03 (see table 2). Hence ln(prr) ≈ 0. Second, we use total population Nj as proxy for
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the amenity factor Aj. Third, we assume that the migration cost τru is equal to:
τru = δ
γ1
ru × exp(γ2Iru + γ3SameStateru + γ4SameDistrictru)
Since Vru = Auwuτru for all u ∈ {1, ..., U}, and Vrr = Arwr equation 1 becomes:
ln(Mru) ≈ θuγ1 ln δru + θuγ2Iru + θuγ3SameStateru + θuγ4SameDistrictru)
+ θu ln(Nu) + θu ln(wu)− θr ln(wr) + (1− θr) ln(Nr)
Which yields the estimating equation 11:
ln(Mru) ≈ β1 ln δru + β2Iru + β3SameStateru + β4SameDistrictru)
+ β5 ln(Nu) + β6 ln(wu) + β7 ln(wr) + β8 ln(Nr)
with βi = θγi for all i = {1, .., 4}, β5 = β6 = θu, β7 = −θr and β8 = 1− θr.
A.7 Structural estimating equation


























































Which we can rewrite as
∆m = (θua∆wu − θr∆wr) (21)
∆wu = φ(θu, ε)[θr∆wr + θub∆wu ] (22)












is the vector of
observed changes in casual wages in rural districts weighted by the probability of not





is the vector of observed changes in casual wages in urban
districts. a and b are observed combinations of migration shares, and φ is a monotonic
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This suggests that once θ is pinned down from the rst equation ε can be identied
uniquely using the second. A bit of algebra yields:
∆m = θua∆wu − θr∆wr (24)
∆wu = [I − θuφ(θu, ε)b]−1θrφ(θu, ε)∆wr (25)
B Data Appendix
B.1 District Controls
Census A number of the district controls are computed from the primary census abstract
of 2001. In all cases, we use information for rural areas only, which we then aggregate to
the district level. We compute fraction of scheduled tribes and fraction of scheduled
castes by dividing by total population. Population density is obtained by dividing
total population by total area. Literacy rate is computed by dividing the number of
literate person. Finally, we use information from the census village directory to compute
irrigated cultivable land per capita and non irrigated cultivable land per capita as
well as the fraction of villages accessed by paved road, the fraction of villages with bus
service, with education facility, medical facility, Post and Telecom facilities, bank, and
electricity connection.
Agricultural Productivity: We compute agricultural productivity per worker for each
agricultural year in each district using two sources of data. First, the Ministry of Agri-
culture publishes yearly data on output and harvest prices of 36 grain and cash crops
in every district 38. This allows us to compute the value of agricultural production for
every district-year. Second, we use National Sample Survey data to estimate the number
of (self employed and wage) workers active in agriculture for every district-year. NSS
survey years match exactly the Ministry of Agriculture denition of agricultural years
(July-June). Hence, dividing output value by the number of agricultural workers yields
agricultural productivity per worker for each NSS survey year.
38Data is available at http://eands.dacnet.nic.in/.
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Rainfall To control for monthly rainfall at the district level over the period 1999-2010,
we use data from the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM), which is a joint mis-
sion between NASA and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). The TRMM
Multi-Satellite Precipitation Analysis provides rainfall data for every three hours at a
resolution of 0.25 by 0.25 degree grid-cell size. Rainfall measurement are made by satel-
lite and calibrated using monthly rain gauge analysis data from the Global Precipitation
Climatology Project (GPCP).39 The data is then aggregated to obtain mean monthly
rainfall for every cell, and scaled up to the district level by averaging over the cells which
overlap with a district (there are on average six grid-cells per district). We compute
cumulative rainfall in each district-month as the sum of rainfall since the last July 1st,
and express it as percentage deviation from the 1998-2011 mean for this district-month.
Other district controls "Pre-election year" is a dummy for whether state assembly
or Panchayati Raj (local) elections are to be held in the following year. To construct
this control, we used online reports from the Electoral Commission of India40 and from
the State Election Commissions of each states. State Government Politically Aligned
with Central Government is a dummy variable for whether the Chief Minister of a state
is member of a party that participates to the Central Government. Log Spending on
Rural Roads Program per Capita is the log of expenditures made in a district under the
Pradhan Mantri Gram Sarak Yozna (PMGSY) divided by the population of the district
according to the 2001 census.41 Log Spending on Watershed Programs per Capita
is the log of expenditures made in a state under the Integrated Wasteland Development
Program (IWDP), the Desert Development Program (DDP) and the Drought Prone Area
Program (DPAP) divided by the population in the state according to the 2001 census.42
B.2 Rural-Urban Short-term Migration Matrix
In this section we describe in details how we construct a bilateral matrix of seasonal
migration ows between each rural and each urban district in 2007-08. Unfortunately,
NSS Employment Survey 2007-08 only reports destination into seven categories: same
district (rural or urban), other district in the same state (rural or urban), another state
(rural or urban), and another country. From this, we estimate for each district of origin
the number of rural seasonal migrants who went to a city in the same district, to a
city in another district of the state and to a city in another state. In order to allocate
39Data is available at http://trmm.gsfc.nasa.gov/.
40http://www.eci.nic.in/ecimain1/index.aspx
41Financial reports for PMGSY are available online at http://pmgsy.nic.in/
42Financial reports for IWDP DDP and DPAP are available online at
http://watershedmpr.nic.in/reports.aspx
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these ows across districts of destinations, we use Census 2001 information on long-term
migrants, i.e. prime age adults living in urban areas who changed residence in the last
10 years and came from rural areas, for which the census records the district of previous
residence.43 From this we construct the probability for long-term migrants from o to go
to a particular district of destination d conditional on staying in the same state or going
outside the state.
Let M07od denote seasonal ows measured in 2007-09. Let So be the state of origin and
Sd the state of destination. From the NSS Employment survey 2007-08, we observe the
number of rural short-term migrant who went to a city within the same district (M07oo ), to









oj ). Let m
01
od denote long-term migration ows measured in the Census 2001.
















if o 6= d and So 6= Sd
Our method relies on two important assumptions. We assume that the proportion of
short-term migrants who go from district o to another district d of the same state is
the same as the proportion of within-state long-term migrants from o who go to district
d. We also assume that the proportion of short-term migrants who go from district o to
district d in another state is the same as the proportion of out-of-state long term migrants
in district d who come from district o. We use ARIS-REDS survey data to test these
assumptions.
B.3 ARIS-REDS Data
As explained in the previous section, we use long-term migration patterns from the Cen-
sus 2001 to impute the exact destinations of short-term migrants, which are not recorded
in the NSS data. In order to provide evidence in support for this procedure, we use the
ARIS/REDS survey collected by the National Council of Applied Economic Research
(Delhi) which are available online http://adfdell.pstc.brown.edu/arisreds_data/
The ARIS-REDS survey covers a nationally representative sample of rural Indian house-
43We are grateful to Ben Olken and Chang-Tai Hsieh for sharing the district-to-district information
for long-term migrants.
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holds, and in 2006 it collected detailed information about both long and short-term
migration. For long-term migrants, the survey instrument collects the name and the dis-
trict of the destination, as well as the distance from the village. For short-term migrants,
the survey instruments collects the name, the distance and the type of location (same dis-
trict, same state, other state). We manually matched destinations and villages of origin
with 2001 Census Districts. Appendix Figure A.5 provides maps of origins, destinations
and ows for both short- and long-term migration. Short-term migration is a rare event:
out of 241 sample villages, all had sent long-term migrants, but only 51 had sent any
short-term migrants. Once matched with 2001 Census districts, we have information on
101 origin districts for long-term migrants, but only 29 origin districts for short-term
migrants. Short-term migration destinations are also concentrated: there are only 46 dif-
ferent districts of destination for short-term migrants, against 398 for long-term migrants
. As a result, the total number of origin×district pairs for short-term migration is only
57 against 1,755 pairs for long-term migration. There are 39 pairs for which we observe
both short and long-term migrants.
B.4 Weighting
The NSSO provides sample weights which ensure that the weighted mean of each outcome
is an unbiased estimate of the average of the outcome for the population National Sample
Survey Oce (2010). For the purpose of our analysis, we re-weight observations so that
the sum of all weights within each district is constant over time and proportional to the
rural population of the district as estimated from the NSS Employment Surveys. As
compared to using ordinary least squares without any weighting, our approach allows us
to make sure that our results are not driven by smaller districts with few observations
for casual wages. More concretely, let wi be the weight for person i, and let Ωdt be the




where ωd is the population weight for district d.
B.5 Construction of the District Panel
During the period covered by the analysis, some districts split while other districts merged
together. Constructing the district panel requires matching districts both over time as
well as across data sets. Fortunately, the NSS district denitions for surveying stayed
constant from 2004 to 2008, despite splits and merges. We therefore use the NSS district
denitions from this period and match other data sets to these. We rst match the NSS
1999-2000 to 2004-05 and 2007-08 data. All districts could be matched between the two
surveys but for ve districts missing in 1999-00. However about fty of them had split
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between 1999-00 and 2005-05. We adopt the following procedure If a given district has
split in x districts (x is most of the time equal to two, sometimes three), we duplicate
observations from that district x times so that one set of observation can be matched
with one of the newly created district. In order to keep the total weight of that district
constant, we divide each weight in the 1999-00 data-set by x. We further match NSS
data with the Census 2001, NREGA phases, agricultural productivity, rainfall, PMGSY
and IWDP/DDP/DPAP spending data from 2001 to 2010.
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Figure A.1: NSS survey coverage in early districts of star and non-star states by quarter
of survey
Figure A.2: Reported seasonal migration in the last 12 months by quarter of survey
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Figure A.3: Urban wages by quarter of survey
Figure A.4: NSS survey coverage in urban areas by quarter of survey
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Notes: Figure (d) only displays the 25% largest migration ows.
56
Figure A.6: Outcome trends before and after NREGA implementation.
(a) Rural Public Works in Early Districts of Star
and Non-Star States
(b) Rural Casual Wages in Early Districts of Star
and Non-Star States
(c) Rural Short-Term Migration in Early Districts
of Star and Non-Star States
(d) Casual Wages in Urban Areas with High/Low
Predicted Migration from Star States (α1)
(e) Casual Wages in Urban Areas with High/Low
Predicted Migration from Other States (α2)
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Table A.1: Correlation between destination choice of short and long-term migrants from
the same origin
OLS OLS Poisson Poisson
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(1+ Long-term Migrants) 0.251 0.352**
(0.175) (0.178)
Long Term Migration Probability 3.198*** 3.346***
(0.515) (0.469)
Same State -0.421 -0.743** -0.569 -0.711**
(0.476) (0.328) (0.375) (0.287)
Same District -1.287* -2.677*** -1.637** -2.829***
(0.720) (0.695) (0.731) (0.629)
Outcome Mean - - 4.07 4.07
Observations 57 57 57 57
Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The unit of observation is an origin x destination district pair. The sample only includes 
pairs with positive flows of short-term migrants. All specifications include origin district fixed 
effects. In Columns 1 and 2 the outcome is the log of the flow of short-term migrants in 2006 ARIS-
REDS. and the estimation is done by OLS. In Columns 3 and 4 the outcome is the number of short-
term migrants  in 2006 ARIS-REDS and the estimation is done by Poisson regression. 
"Log(1+Long-term Migrants)" is the log of one plus the number of  long-term migrants according 
to 2006 ARIS-REDS. "Long Term Migration Probability" is the proportion of rural long-term 
migrants from the origin district who went to the destination district between 1991 and 2001 
conditional on migrating in the same state or in another state, according to the 2001 Census. 
Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for correlation of the errors between state pairs (36 
clusters). ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. 
Log Short-Term Migrants Number Short-Term Migrants
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Table A.2: Impact of the NREGA on urban wages controlling for wage trends between
1999-00 and 2004-05
(1) (2)
       * Post 0.426*** 0.32**
(0.158) (0.157)
       * Post -0.076** -0.057**
(0.036) (0.028)
Observations 16338 16338
Workers Controls Yes Yes
District Controls Yes Yes
Log Real Casual Wages
2004-05 to 2007-08
Each column presents results from a separate regression. The outcome is 
log deflated casual earnings. All specifications include district and year 
fixed effects. The sample is composed of urban adults surveyed in NSS 
from July 2004 to June 2005 and July 2007 to June 2008. Star state is a 
dummy variable equal to one for Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, 
Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and Uttarkhand. 
Post is a time dummy equal to one for the period 2007-08. District Controls 
are presented in Table 1. Worker controls include a set of dummy variable 
for age group, gender, education level, social group and religion. Standard 
errors are clustered at the district level. ***, ** and * indicate significance 




Table A.3: Impact of the NREGA on urban wages with separate trends for early districts
and star states
1999-00      
2004-05
2007-08   
2011-12
(1) (2) (3) (4)
       * Post 0.589*** 0.403*** -0.218 -0.102
(0.199) (0.168) (0.161) (0.209)
       * Post -0.099** -0.065* 0.011 0.012
(0.047) (0.035) (0.044) (0.041)
Early District * Post 0.132** 0.103** -0.047 -0.111**
(0.062) (0.048) (0.068) (0.054)
Star State * Post 0.105 0.118** -0.101* -0.031
(0.065) (0.052) (0.054) (0.062)
Early * Star State * Post -0.187*** -0.126* 0.124 0.186***
(0.079) (0.072) (0.088) (0.068)
Observations 16338 16338 20301 14598
District Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Real Casual Wages
2004-05                                 
2007-08
Each column presents results from a separate regression. The outcome is log deflated 
casual earnings. All specifications include district and year fixed effects. The sample is 
composed of urban adults surveyed in NSS: (i) from July 2004 to June 2005 and July 2007 
to June 2008 (Column 1 and 2), (ii) from July 1999 to June 2000 and July 2004 to June 
2005 (Column 3) (iii) from July 2007 to June 2008 and from July 2011 to June 2012 
(Column 4). Star state is a dummy variable equal to one for Andhra Pradesh, Himachal 
Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and Uttarkhand. In 
column 1 and 2 Post is a time dummy equal to one for the period 2007-08.  In column 3 
Post is a time dummy equal to one for the period 2004-2005. In column 4 Post is a time 
dummy equal to one for the period 2011-2012.  District Controls are presented in Table 1. 
Worker controls include a set of dummy variable for age group, gender, education level, 
social group and religion. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. ***, ** and * 




Table A.4: Impact of the NREGA on urban wages without using urban wages to predict
migration ows
1999-00      
2004-05
2007-08   
2011-12
(1) (2) (3) (4)
       * Post 0.557*** 0.406** -0.246* -0.011
(0.196) (0.179) (0.148) (0.191)
       * Post -0.089** -0.063** 0.028 -0.009
(0.038) (0.032) (0.032) (0.037)
Observations 16338 16338 20301 14598
Workers Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Real Casual Wages
2004-05                                 
2007-08
Each column presents results from a separate regression. The outcome is log 
deflated casual earnings. All specifications include district and year fixed effects. 
The sample is composed of urban adults surveyed in NSS: (i) from July 2004 to 
June 2005 and July 2007 to June 2008 (Column 1 and 2), (ii) from July 1999 to June 
2000 and July 2004 to June 2005 (Column 3) (iii) from July 2007 to June 2008 and 
from July 2011 to June 2012 (Column 4). In Panel A the sample is restricted to early 
districts. In Panel B and C it excludes early districts. Star state is a dummy variable 
equal to one for Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, 
Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and Uttarkhand. In column 1 and 2 Post is a time dummy 
equal to one for the period 2007-08.  In column 3 Post is a time dummy equal to one 
for the period 2004-2005. In column 4 Post is a time dummy equal to one for the 
period 2011-2012.  District Controls are presented in Table 1. Worker controls 
include a set of dummy variable for age group, gender, education level, social group 
and religion. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. ***, ** and * indicate 




Table A.5: Impact of the NREGA on urban wages by season
1999-00      
2004-05
2007-08   
2011-12
(1) (2) (3) (4)
       * Post * Dry Season 0.586** 0.474* -0.354** -0.308
(0.269) (0.249) (0.178) (0.349)
       * Post * Dry Season -0.084 -0.057 0.036 0.02
(0.062) (0.052) (0.047) (0.063)
       * Post * Rainy Season 0.591*** 0.427** -0.221 0.287*
(0.227) (0.198) (0.224) (0.173)
       * Post * Rainy Season -0.098 -0.088 0.01 -0.047
(0.06) (0.058) (0.045) (0.039)
Observations 16338 16338 20301 14598
District Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Real Casual Wages
2004-05                                 
2007-08
Each column presents results from a separate regression. The outcome is log deflated 
casual earnings. All specifications include district and year fixed effects. The sample is 
composed of urban adults surveyed in NSS: (i) from July 2004 to June 2005 and July 2007 
to June 2008 (Column 1 and 2), (ii) from July 1999 to June 2000 and July 2004 to June 
2005 (Column 3) (iii) from July 2007 to June 2008 and from July 2011 to June 2012 
(Column 4). Star state is a dummy variable equal to one for Andhra Pradesh, Himachal 
Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and Uttarkhand. In 
column 1 and 2 Post is a time dummy equal to one for the period 2007-08.  In column 3 
Post is a time dummy equal to one for the period 2004-2005. In column 4 Post is a time 
dummy equal to one for the period 2011-2012.  Rainy Season is a dummy variable equal to 
one for the months of July to December, Dry Season is a dummy equal to one for January 
to June. District Controls are presented in Table 1. Worker controls include a set of dummy 
variable for age group, gender, education level, social group and religion. Standard errors 







Table A.6: Main results excluding the period in which NREGA was completly rolled out
(April-June 2008)
Urban Areas




Log Real Casual 
Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Star State * Post 5.386*** 0.0445 -1.819**
(1.213) (0.0316) (0.902)
       * Post 0.52***
(0.199)
       * Post -0.07*
(0.039)
Observations 221,335 46,393 221,335 14614
Workers Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Each column presents results from a separate regression.  In Column 1 the outcome is the estimated number 
of days spent on public works per adult per year.   In Column 2 and 4 the outcome is log deflated casual 
earnings. In Column 3 the outcome is a binary variable which is equal to 100 if workers have spent one to 
six months away from the village for work during the last year. All specifications include district and year 
fixed effects. The sample is composed of adults surveyed in NSS: (i) in rural areas from July 1999 to June 
2000 and July 2007 to March 2008 (Column 1 to 3), (ii) in urban areas from July 2004 to June 2005 and July 
2007 to March 2008 (Column 4). Star state is a dummy variable equal to one for Andhra Pradesh, Himachal 
Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and Uttarkhand. Post is a time dummy 
equal to one for the period 2007-08.  District Controls are presented in Table 1. Worker controls include a 
set of dummy variable for age group, gender, education level, social group and religion. Standard errors are 
clustered at the district level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. 
Rural Areas of Early Districts
𝜶𝟏
𝜶𝟐
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